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Whose agenda Is It?
Abuses of women and abuses of ‘culture’ in Britain1
MOIRA DUSTIN
Equality and Diversity Forum, UK
ANNE PHILLIPS
London School of Economics, UK
ABSTRACT Developments in Britain reflect a shift from a shallow but widely
endorsed multiculturalism to a growing preoccupation with abuses of women in
minority cultural groups. Four main issues have been debated in the media and have
become the basis of either public policy or legal judgment: forced marriage, honour
killing, female genital cutting and women’s Islamic dress. The treatment of these
issues has often been problematic, with discourses over culture tending to mis-
represent minority cultural groups as monolithic entities, and initiatives to protect
women becoming entangled with anti-immigration agendas. It has therefore proved
hard to address abuses of women without simultaneously promoting stereotypes of
culture. The most encouraging signs of resolving these tensions appear where there
has been a prior history of women’s activism, and a greater willingness on the part
of government to draw groups into consultation. We argue that this offers a greater
prospect of devising effective initiatives that do not set up multiculturalism in
opposition to women’s rights.
KEY WORDS FGM ● forced marriage ● gender equality ● hijab ● honour crime
● multiculturalism
British discourse on multiculturalism and women’s rights has been in many
ways emblematic of the concerns underpinning this special issue of
Ethnicities. Britain is multiethnic, though this is more evident in the cities
than the rural areas, and in the older industrial parts of England than much
of Scotland or Wales. Except for a short period after the Second World War,
non-white immigration was not actively promoted. However, more or less
A R T I C L E
Copyright © SAGE Publications 2008 (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Signapore) 1468-7968
Vol 8(3): 405–424; 092451
DOI:10.1177/1468796808092451
http://etn.sagepub.com
405-424 092451 Dustin (D)  22/7/08  15:51  Page 405
grudgingly accepted obligations, first to Commonwealth passport holders,
and later to refugees displaced by global conflict, have combined with
principles of family reunification to mean that a significant proportion of
the population (nearly 8%) is now of non-European origin. Multicultural-
ism was never adopted as official policy, but in a process described as ‘multi-
cultural drift’ (Runnymede Trust Commission, 2000: 14), public policies
increasingly took account of ethnocultural diversity. Surveys of legal
practice reveal a substantial body of legislation and legal precedent accom-
modating practices associated with minority ethnic, religious and cultural
groups, while interpretations of anti-discrimination law have sometimes
allowed members of minorities to depart from what were otherwise
universal rules (Poulter, 1986, 1998). Multiculturalism evolved as part of a
vague general background to public policy, directly invoked primarily by
teachers and social workers, but when thought about, broadly endorsed.
In the 1960s and 1970s, multiculturalism was most commonly associated
with a celebration of cultural diversity in schools, and not seen as having
any particular gender dimension. With hindsight, it clearly did. In 1969, for
example, the Court of Appeal overturned a care order on a 13-year-old girl
living in London with her 26-year-old husband, invoking principles of
cultural relativism to describe marriage at 13 as ‘entirely natural’ in Nigeria,
where the marriage had been conducted.2 In a less contentious decision in
1975, widows of ‘potentially polygamous’ marriages were recognized as
entitled to a widow’s pension, even though their marriage was invalid under
British law.3 A significant number of legal judgments have turned on the
relevance and interpretations of Islamic family law, and how far this should
be employed to determine the property rights of divorced women where
one or other spouse is a foreign national. As Okin (1999), Shachar (2001)
and others have stressed, cultures differentiate themselves largely through
the ways they regulate personal, sexual and reproductive life, and much of
what we understand by cultural difference relates to the expectations
attached to being women and men. Policies of multicultural accommo-
dation are therefore likely to have particular significance for gender roles.
Yet up until the late 1990s, public discourse in the UK did not generally link
multiculturalism to either gender or women’s rights. In this, it paralleled the
academic literature, which was surprisingly unfocused on the gender dimen-
sions of multicultural policy prior to Susan Moller Okin’s interventions.
Over the past 10 years, this has radically changed. Multiculturalism is
now very much on the defensive, criticized for what is said to be its failure
to integrate newcomers and its promotion of ‘parallel lives’. As an import-
ant sub-theme in this, it is criticized for what is said to be its complacency
as regards the treatment of women. There has been a new concern with the
values that supposedly underpin British citizenship, and the government
has introduced citizenship classes as a compulsory part of the school
curriculum (2002); citizenship ceremonies for new nationals (2004); and a
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citizenship test (2005) requiring applicants to demonstrate a working
knowledge of the English language and life in the UK. The focus on ‘core
British values’ (usually indistinguishable from the values of dozens of other
countries) parallels moves across the rest of Europe, where Christian
Joppke (2004: 249) notes a ‘seismic shift’ from a language of multicultural-
ism to one of civic integration. As in other parts of Europe, these core values
turn out to include a commitment to gender equality, now represented as
in tension with multiculturalism.
The story of this refiguring of public discourse starts in 1997, with the
election of a Labour Government (after 18 years in opposition) and a
doubling in the number of women parliamentarians (though still to less
than one in five). This last meant significantly more MPs willing to speak
out against abuses of women, and a substantial rise in the parliamentary
time devoted to matters such as forced marriage and female genital
mutilation (FGM). There was a noticeable increase over the same period in
newspaper coverage of cases of forced marriage and ‘honour’ killing, and it
would be hard to say precisely whose agenda was driving the shifts in public
discourse and policy. What we can say is that four issues came to the fore:
first, forced marriage, ‘honour’ crime and female genital cutting (FGC);4
and later, the permissibility of restrictive forms of Muslim dress, like the
jilbab (a full-length gown exposing only face, hands and feet) and niqab (a
face veil, exposing only the eyes). Each of these raised the question of
whether minority women and girls were being particularly exposed to
violence or coercion. This is self-evidently a concern as regards forced
marriage, ‘honour’ crime, and FGC. The presumption of coercion is much
more contentious in the case of women wearing the jilbab or niqab, but here
too there was concern that women were being unduly pressured by family
or religious leaders to adopt unnecessarily confining styles of dress.
All four issues then helped fuel popular or media representations of
minority cultural/religious groups as particularly oppressive to women,
and of minority women and girls as particularly in need of protection
from their families and communities. They therefore lent themselves to an
anti-minority discourse. Yet the first three, at least, also reflected years of
campaigning by women active within their minority communities, who had
long called for more effective action. There were plenty of people voicing
reservations about multiculturalism 10 years ago, but the more specific idea
that support for multiculturalism might mean a lack of concern for women’s
rights came mostly from a small number of women’s groups, active within
minority communities, and addressing issues of violence against children or
women. Foremost among these was Southall Black Sisters, established in
1979 to meet the needs of Asian and African-Caribbean women, increas-
ingly active around issues of forced marriage, and developing a critique of
multiculturalism as encouraging an informal contract between government
and the more conservative leaders of minority communities (Gupta, 2003).
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Other organizations included Foundation for Women’s Health Research
and Development (FORWARD, a mainly African women’s organization
with a particular focus on FGC), Newham Asian Women’s Project, and the
Muslim Women’s Helpline; these had been providing services to individual
women and campaigning on the wider issues for years.
One of our central points, then, is that there was a history of minority
women’s activism on FGC, forced marriage and ‘honour’ crime before these
became prominent in public policy and debate. Women’s groups had called
for more effective public action, arguing – sometimes with direct reference
to the risks of multiculturalism – that violence against minority women
was being overlooked or ignored, and taking on, in the process, both the
hostility of more conservative members of minority communities and
the indifference of the general public. Activists sometimes complained that
the government was failing to act because of an exaggerated respect for
cultural difference. In 1998, for example, Hannana Siddiqui of Southall
Black Sisters criticized inaction on forced marriage, arguing that the ‘failure
to act to help Asian women who are kidnapped and taken abroad to be
married is basically racist’. ‘They are saying “we have to be sensitive and
not criticize other cultures” but in doing that they are allowing violations of
women’s human rights to continue’ (Independent, 1998). Yet when the
issues were more generally taken up, they threatened to become entangled
with anti-immigration or anti-multiculturalism agendas, encouraging
representations of minority cultural groups as inherently backward or
oppressive, and stereotyping women from these groups as ‘victims without
agency’ (Shachar, 2001: 66).
Inaction could be seen as racist, but then so too could action. Women
were being abused, but so too were conceptions of ‘culture’. In both
academic and popular discussions of multiculturalism, there has been a
tendency towards what Uma Narayan (2000) describes as cultural essential-
ism, or Seyla Benhabib (2002: 4) as a ‘reductionist sociology of culture’: a
tendency to represent cultures as more distinct from one another, less
marked by internal contestation, and more determining of individual
behaviour, than is ever the case. In popular representations, this cultural
reification often involves an ordering of so-called ‘cultures’ along an axis of
backward to progressive, with minority or non-European cultures cast in
the lesser role. It tends to read the actions and beliefs of people from
minority or non-western cultures simply as expressions of ‘their culture’,
which not only presumes an extraordinary degree of homogeneity within
the cultural group, but also denies individual agency. Something statistically
more prevalent in some cultural groups than others then gets mis-described
as a ‘cultural practice’ – as if something such as forced marriage (which is
more likely, of course, where there has been a tradition of arranged
marriage) is a cherished cultural tradition ‘practised’ by all committed
members of the group. In this context, it becomes harder to address abuses
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of women without simultaneously promoting stereotypes of culture. That
tension between different agendas is a major theme in our article.
Adding to the complexities in the British case is the way questions of
culture have been merged with questions of religion, with complicated and
sometimes contradictory results. In addressing forced marriage, FGC and
‘honour’ crime, women activists and government spokespeople alike were
careful to stress that the ‘practice’ in question had no religious legitimation,
and was grounded in culture not religious belief. By implication, officials
accepted a long-standing liberal belief that it is not appropriate for govern-
ments to intervene in matters of religious conviction, and that a practice
required by a religion (such as kosher or halal meat) has a privileged claim.
The more recent furore about Muslim women wearing the face veil, or
Muslim girls wearing the jilbab to school modifies this. Hijab is self-
evidently linked to religion,5 poses no obvious harm to women and was
not the focus of any prior activist campaign. Yet in the context of an
increasingly militant secularism, this too became a focus of attack.
What complicates the picture is that religion continues to be privileged
in public discourse, so that even in a period when Islam in particular is
regarded with suspicion, the government has demonstrated considerable
sympathy on matters of religion. Soon after its election in 1997, the Labour
government ended a de facto privileging of Christian and Jewish schools,
and approved public funding for a (much smaller) number of Muslim,
Sikh, Greek Orthodox and Seventh Day Adventist schools. More recently,
it has also extended anti-discrimination legislation to include religion and
belief. Northern Ireland has long had legislation against religious
discrimination, but there was no parallel law in the rest of the UK, where
anti-discrimination laws dealt only with sex, race and disability. Following
European directives, the British government corrected this through its
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. It later passed
a fully-fledged Equality Act 2006, which extended anti-discrimination
protection to the grounds of religion or belief on the one side and sexual
orientation on the other (setting the scene for some interesting future legal
tussles). It also established the Equality and Human Rights Commission,
bringing all the existing bodies dealing with discrimination under one
umbrella. After much public debate, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act
2006 was passed, extending existing prohibitions on incitement to racial
hatred to include religious hatred.6 Religion continues to play a significant
role in discussions of educational provision and funding, with government
support for the expansion of faith schools, and scope for religious groups to
shape the school curriculum in the newly developed academies. In many
ways, then, the privileged position of religion has increased in recent years.
Yet this has coincided with a greater willingness (by politicians as well as
media) to challenge practices represented as oppressive to women, even
when these are authorized by religion as well as by culture.
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FORCED MARRIAGE
Government initiatives against forced marriage date from 1999, when the
British Home Office set up a Working Group on Forced Marriage, partly in
response to media coverage of three dramatic cases, and acknowledged the
prior activism and experience of minority women’s groups by inviting
Hannana Siddiqui of Southall Black Sisters to join (for fuller discussion of
the forced marriage initiatives, see Deveaux, 2006; Phillips and Dustin, 2004;
Siddiqui, 2005). A Community Liaison Unit was subsequently established
in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), charged with dealing with
the so-called ‘overseas dimension’: the coercion, that is, of people into
marriages with unknown or unwanted spouses from overseas. The unreveal-
ing title (‘community liaison’) reflects what was already considerable sensi-
tivity about the way initiatives against forced marriage might be perceived,
and it was not until 2005 that this was relaunched as the Forced Marriage
Unit. Official publications were careful to distinguish between arranged and
forced marriage, representing the former as an entirely legitimate marriage
practice and the latter as condemned by all major religions; and it is clear
that government spokespeople wanted to avoid any suggestion that it was
criticizing consensual arranged marriage.
In its focus, however, on marriages with overseas partners, the govern-
ment courted suspicion that its work was designed to reduce citizenship
applications from new spouses arriving from overseas. The unit has
provided a vital helpline for young people threatened with an unwanted
marriage, with a current case load of 250–300 a year; and in liaison with the
British High Commission and police forces in Pakistan, India and
Bangladesh helps repatriate an annual average of 200 people who had been
taken abroad by families for marriage. The unit has helped find alternative
accommodation in women’s refuges for those who cannot return to the
family home; and through its guidelines for police officers, social workers
and teachers, helped shift practice from a previous over-reliance on the
mediation of family members and community spokesmen towards more
unconditional support for the individuals themselves. Yet staff have
commented on their frustration in not being able to offer much help to
those coerced into marriage with partners in the UK. Though relaunched
in 2005 as a joint Home Office and FCO enterprise, the Forced Marriage
Unit is still physically located in the FCO, not (as might be more plausible)
alongside the Home Office’s work on domestic violence.
Subsequent policy developments reflect both these problems: the
tendency to focus exclusively on overseas marriages, therefore coding the
initiatives on forced marriage as initiatives on immigration; and the repre-
sentation of forced marriage as in a distinct ‘cultural’ category rather than
part of a larger spectrum of familial and domestic violence. On the first
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point, the government has moved towards a higher minimum age for
marriages with overseas partners, refusing entry clearance to overseas
spouses until both parties are at least 18 years old. The restriction (inspired
by the Danish initiative7) was first introduced in 2003, and there is currently
consultation on whether to raise the age further to 21. The rationale is to
protect the most vulnerable from coercion, the not unreasonable presump-
tion being that an 18, 21 or 24 year old is in a better position to resist family
pressures than a girl or boy of 16. But the effect is a two-tier system. Those
marrying in the UK or choosing partners from elsewhere in the European
Union (EU) can get married and live with their partners at 16; those
seeking a partner from their family’s (non-EU) country of origin must wait
till they have reached a higher standard of maturity. This differential
approach derives what plausibility it has from the representation of young
people from minority cultural groups as unusually subject to cultural/
religious coercion. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that this is a cultural
stereotype, representing the parents as intrinsically more coercive, and the
young people as intrinsically less able than those from majority groups to
exercise autonomy or know their own minds (see Phillips, 2007 for a further
development of this argument).
On the second point, the government has recently conducted a consul-
tation exercise to decide whether to create a specific criminal offence of
forcing someone into marriage.8 The 2000 Working Party had rejected this
idea, arguing that existing laws against threatening behaviour, assault,
kidnap and rape provided a perfectly adequate basis for any prosecutions.
Punitive measures may also be unhelpful, because most people do not want
to give evidence that would lead to the prosecution of family members.
There are also principled reasons for preferring generic over culture-
specific legislation. Coercion of women and young people happens in all
cultures and communities, and should be illegal for all. Creating a specific
offence of forced marriage obscures the similarities with other kinds of
domestic violence and coercion in majority or dominant communities, and
may encourage the view that forced marriage is a cultural norm within
minority communities. In the event, both women’s groups and police forces
were divided on the usefulness of a new law, and the consultation convinced
the government not to introduce it.
More recently, a private members’ bill was introduced to the UK parlia-
ment, with the support of some minority women’s NGOs, that employs the
civil, not criminal, courts to provide protection. Unusually, the bill won
government approval and was passed in July 2007 as an addition to other
legislation addressing domestic violence. This latest development therefore
potentially meets both of the criticisms noted above. It provides recourse
for people coerced into marriage with domestic, not just overseas, partners,
thereby shifting the focus of official activity away from its problematic
association with immigration; and it places forced marriage within the wider
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context of domestic violence, thereby favouring generic over culture-
specific legislation. At the time of writing, the new measures had yet to be
implemented.
‘HONOUR’ CRIMES
As regards ‘honour’ crimes, public agencies were again slow to take up the
issue; and when they did, there were again concerns about the ways in which
the issue was addressed. The term ‘honour’ crime has been widely adopted
to describe a range of violent crimes against women said to be rooted in
community perceptions of honour. One early British initiative was the
Project on Strategies to Address ‘Crimes of Honour’, set up in 1999, and
jointly coordinated by the Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws
(CIMEL) at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London, and the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Rights
(INTERIGHTS). At a more case-by-case level, community and women’s
groups – including Newham Asian Women’s Project, Southall Black Sisters,
Kurdish Women Action Against Honour Killings, and Iranian and Kurdish
Women’s Rights Project – have been dealing with crimes of ‘honour’ over
a number of years. The significant moment for official action came in 2003,
when a Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) report on domestic violence
identified ‘honour’ crime as an important area for future work, set up a
Strategic Homicide Prevention Working Group on Honour Killings, and
began to develop its strategy, including training for front-line staff.9 The
immediate catalyst – and this mirrors the pattern with forced marriage –
was extensive media coverage in 2002 of the murder of 16-year-old Heshu
Younes, killed by her Turkish father after he learnt of her affair with a
Lebanese Christian man.10 The media categorization of this as an ‘honour’
crime helped make this visible as a new area of public policy.
Yet in this field, perhaps more than any other, definitions are highly
problematic (Welchman and Hossain, 2005). Use of the term honour can
suggest that the crimes are in some sense honourable (it is for this reason
that we have followed the practice of putting quotation marks around
‘honour’). The implied contrast between crimes of ‘honour’ (associated with
the East) and crimes of passion (associated with the West) can also feed an
Orientalism that represents minority cultural groups as profoundly
different in their values and behaviour from majority cultural groups (Abu-
Odeh, 1997). ‘Honour-based’ violence is perceived as distinct in important
ways from ‘ordinary’ domestic violence: as more likely, for example, to be
condoned by the community of perpetrators and victims or more likely to
involve planning and deliberation, to the point of a conspiracy to commit a
crime. There is a danger that this differentiation will encourage a false
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dichotomy between minority and majority communities, with crimes in the
former explained by reference to ‘culture’, and those in the latter under-
stood as individual aberration (Phillips, 2003, 2007; Volpp, 2000). In this
scenario, it is the perpetrators as much as the victims who are seen as
without agency, portrayed, and sometimes portraying themselves, as acting
according to the unwritten laws of their culture. In such discourses, culture
is credited with a compelling power to direct and drive behaviour – as if it
is culture rather than people that kills.
Faced with the abuses of ‘culture’, it is tempting to refuse the categoriz-
ation of a discrete body of ‘honour’ killings or ‘honour-based’ crime, and
insist on treating these as part of the wider category of domestic violence
and violence against women. This would parallel the argument above about
the treatment of forced marriage within a broader framework of domestic
violence, and is, to some extent, the emerging consensus within minority
women’s NGOs, as well as partnership organizations such as the Women’s
National Commission and the End Violence Against Women campaign. But
it is important not to do this in ways that then blur important differences.
As Purna Sen puts it, ‘[t]o posit a specificity that is flawed and that fails to
see linkages is problematic; to deny specificity if it exists is also problem-
atic’ (Sen, 2005: 50). Where ‘honour-based’ violence can be differentiated
from the wider category of violence against women, then recognizing its
specificity may save lives.
This last is very much the strategy of the MPS, which has worked on
developing a matrix of risk factors seen as precursors to domestic violence
in general, and to ‘honour-based’ violence in particular, and hopes to use
these early warning signs to prevent (rather than just punish) the crime.
In pursuit of this, detectives started in 2004 to re-examine 109 possible
‘honour-related’ killings – not with a view to re-opening the cases, many
of which had already resulted in a conviction, but so as to improve under-
standing of the phenomenon and help prevent future incidence. One
worry about this is that the MPS increasingly operates with a broad brush
understanding of ‘honour-based’ crime, described as any crime ‘perceived
to have been motivated by dishonour to a family or community, either by
the victim or by any other person’ (MPS, 2005). It takes this to include
instances of forced marriage and, on occasion, FGM. There is a risk here
that ‘honour’ will become the shorthand term for all forms of domestic
violence and child abuse within minority ethnic communities, with every
incident reported as such in the media, and treated as such by the police.
There is some evidence of this happening, certainly as regards media
reports.
But failing to act vigorously on ‘honour-based’ violence is not an option,
and recent events suggest that the bigger problem is that not enough is
being done. In June 2007, a father and uncle were convicted of the murder
of 20-year-old Banaz Mahmood, in a killing that had all the hallmarks of an
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‘honour’ crime, where the victim had repeatedly told police that her family
were trying to kill her, and yet been disregarded by the officer who inter-
viewed her as manipulative and melodramatic. The failure to implement the
MPS’s proposed training package for front-line staff was held partly
responsible for this, as was the fact that police forces outside London have
been less active on the issue. It also seems plausible, however, that cultural
stereotypes got in the way, so that what should have registered as a life or
death case of domestic violence was dismissed as self-dramatization. A
focus on ‘honour’ killing or ‘honour-based’ violence threatens to exagger-
ate the cultural component in what remains a form of domestic violence;
but a failure to train police officers in the specificities of ‘honour’ crime can
also leave people exposed to unthinking cultural stereotypes.
FEMALE GENITAL CUT TING/MUTILATION
Public attention to forced marriage and ‘honour’ crime is very much a
matter of the last decade. By contrast, FGC/FGM became a matter of
public concern in the early 1980s, when a Malian child died after excision
(Dorkenoo and Elworthy, 1994: 142) and there were reports of operations
being carried out in private clinics. The NGO organization FORWARD
was also instrumental in raising concerns. Yet what eventually became the
Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 mostly presented an oppor-
tunity for politicians to unite in condemning what was represented as an
unsavoury imported practice, without committing the government to any
significant budgetary costs. This largely symbolic nature of FGM politics
has continued through to the more recent Female Genital Mutilation Act
2003.
The 1985 Act was based on the kind of double standard that has since
dominated the international literature (for example, Chase, 2002; Gunning,
1992). Concerns emerged in the course of debate that the initial wording
would criminalize cases where a ‘perfectly healthy’ girl develops an anxiety
about the shape or size of her genitalia, and her mental distress is only
relieved by surgery, colloquially known as ‘trimming’. It was suggested that
8000 ‘legitimate’ operations were carried out on women’s genitals each
year, including 10 to 20 ‘trimming’ operations. The medical colleges and
bodies mobilized to block legislation that would criminalize these
procedures, and the government then insisted on an amendment that
allowed genital surgery ‘where necessary for physical or mental health’, but
precluded account being taken of ‘any belief . . . that the operation is
required as a matter of custom or ritual’. In effect, a girl or woman could
have surgery to enable her to conform to majority social norms, but not to
conform to those regarded as minority ‘cultural’ norms.
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Though this differential treatment was challenged by the Commission
for Racial Equality, feminist groups did not raise it as a major issue. This
partly reflects the consensus of the period, for it was mostly from the late
1980s that feminists began to address the cultural arrogance that had
seeped through some of the international campaigning against FGM. It is
notable, however, that there was also no significant debate on this when
new legislation was enacted in 2003. The arrival of refugees from Somalia,
Sudan, and other practising countries had combined with continuing
pressure from NGOs such as FORWARD to revive interest in the
problem in the late 1990s; the catalyst for fresh legislation was the All-
Party Parliamentary Group on Population Development and Reproduc-
tive Health, which produced a report in 2000. The 2003 Act replaced the
term ‘circumcision’ by ‘mutilation’, and made it illegal to take a girl or
woman abroad to be excised or infibulated, but otherwise reproduced the
earlier language and terms of reference, including the caveat about
mental health. Indeed, since the later legislation increases the maximum
sentence to 14 years, and creates a new offence of assisting a girl to
mutilate her genitalia, it can be said to differentiate still more sharply
between ‘cultural’ and ‘cosmetic’ cases. RAINBO, a leading international
NGO, recommended the bill be amended to apply to all non-consenting
minors, whether the reasons for the operation were ‘cosmetic’ or ‘custom-
ary’; and not apply to any consenting adult, again regardless of whether
the reasons were cosmetic or customary. These recommendations were not
taken up.
As with the proposed legislation to criminalize forced marriage, it could
be said that existing laws provided as much as could be required: there was
the 1985 Act; but also others such as the Children Act 1989, which gives
local authorities in Britain the power to intervene to protect a child, includ-
ing the power to prevent her being taken out of the country. Even support-
ers of the legislation acknowledge it is hard to see how the only new clause
can be enforced, short of requiring the forcible inspection of any female
child returning from a visit to Somalia or the Sudan. It is commonly said
that the main purpose is indeed symbolic, sending a clear message to the
target communities that the practice is unacceptable. Yet in the absence of
well-funded educational work, there is no evidence that the message has got
through. Implementation was delayed to allow time to inform the relevant
communities; letters of guidance were circulated to police, health
professionals and social workers; and some organizations (including the
Agency for Culture and Change Management and Black Women’s Health
and Family Support) were given some funding by the Home Office. Black
women’s organizations and service-providers say, however, that many
members of practising communities, and indeed midwives, remain unaware
that FGM is illegal in the UK, and that girls are still being taken abroad for
operations.
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That said, the passage of time between the two laws suggests some
improvement in the mechanisms whereby grassroots organizations can
influence legislation. The 2003 Act had what was in effect a steering group
in the form of the FGM Sub-group of the Violence Against Women Working
Group, convened by the Women’s National Commission,11 and including
representatives of service-providers, women’s groups, national and inter-
national NGOs, and the Home Office. The Working Group was the most
expert and inclusive yet to work on these issues, though once the bill
became law, the Home Office withdrew from participation, and was not
replaced by representatives from the most relevant departments for imple-
mentation, Health and Education. As with the earlier legislation, it seemed
the symbolism was enough, with little subsequent government leadership
on the issue.
In the absence of a coordinated implementation strategy, NGOs have
had to do the best they can on limited resources.12 The result has been
patchy and involves complicated judgments between ‘recognizing the sensi-
tivity and complexity of issues related to FGM, and avoiding becoming
judgmental or punitive’ while not becoming so ‘paralyzed by being seen as
racist or being confused by arguments based on culture, tradition or religion
that you do nothing’.13 No national standards of good practice have been
established, raising concerns about sensitivity and confidentiality. In July
2002, for example, the Sheffield Area Child Protection Committee wrote an
open letter to all Somali parents warning them to reconsider if they were
planning to take their children on holiday to be circumcised.14 This
approach seems likely to provoke resentment and hostility, but in the
absence of a more general education and information programme, was felt
to be the only way to inform parents that circumcision was illegal. By July
2007, there had still been no prosecutions under the 2003 Act and the
London Metropolitan Police had taken the remarkable course of offering
a maximum £20,000 reward for information leading to a prosecution.
Clearly, neither statutory nor voluntary service providers believe that the
problem has gone away.
The most striking gap in the initiative has been the failure to identify the
scale of the problem. No nationwide prevalence research was funded until
2006, and a quarter of a century after the issue was raised as a public
concern, the only figure available for the UK remains FORWARD’s
estimate that 6500 girls are at risk of FGM every year. This causes particular
difficulty in targeting scarce resources. Campaigners and service-providers
suggest, for example, that teachers should look out for girls coming back
from lengthy holidays and taking a long time going to the toilet, and that
midwives should be prepared for pregnant women asking to be re-
infibulated after their child is born. In the absence, however, of data on the
prevalence of these two scenarios, it is difficult for NGOs to know whether
to target resources on schoolgirls or prioritize adult women. To complicate
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matters further, the dispersal of asylum-seekers around the country means
that practising communities are now less likely to be clustered in the large
urban areas where service-providers are more aware of the issue, and more
likely to face incomprehension from teachers or midwives in areas where
they are a small minority.
FGM presents particularly acute strategic problems, as a now criminal-
ized practice where the offender is likely to be the parent or relative of the
victim and unlikely to perceive him/herself as criminal. The former Director
of FORWARD was clear that it must be treated as child abuse: ‘FGM is
child abuse – no ifs, buts, or maybes’ (Kwateng-Kluvitse, 2004). But treating
it as child abuse implies sending offenders to prison and taking children into
local authority care; and all involved see this as deeply problematic. The
issue is further complicated when it comes to adult women, for while it is
easy to support a ban on circumcising a baby or young girl, it is harder to
say why an adult woman cannot choose circumcision, or even why an adult
woman defibulated before childbirth should not be permitted a reinfibula-
tion after. The ban on adult operations looks a striking inconsistency in a
country that has seen an increase in cosmetic surgery, including requests for
‘genitoplasty’ or labial reductions, with no opposition or debate.
This returns us again to questions of autonomy, and the very different
presumptions made about people’s capacity for agency and deliberate
choice, depending on whether they come from minority or majority groups.
If the issue were simply the harm to women, or the risks of the operation,
we might expect legislation to ban more intrusive forms of cosmetic surgery,
but permit less intrusive forms of circumcision (for adult women, that is).
Yet under current UK law, the key distinction is still whether the surgery is
‘cosmetic’ or ‘cultural’, with no apparent recognition that the demand for
the first can also reflect cultural pressures, or that the demand for the second
might, in some circumstances, reflect deliberate and reflective choice. The
issues here are difficult, and it is not surprising that organizations such as
FORWARD prefer to focus on FGM as a matter of child abuse. But the
more testing issues as regards women’s rights and autonomy are, to that
extent, put on hold.
HEADSCARVES
Until recently, there was little public discussion about Muslim headscarves
in Britain. Decisions on school dress codes are commonly left to school
governing bodies; and the absence of any strong secular discourse regard-
ing the separation of church and state meant there was no direct parallel to
the French debates on laïcité. The first significant case involved not head-
scarves, but the jilbab. In 2004, Shabina Begum took legal action against her
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school, Denbigh High, on the grounds that it had unlawfully denied her
freedom to manifest her religion. The majority of pupils and the head-
mistress were in fact Muslim, and the governing body had long adopted
a uniform permitting girls to wear a skirt, trousers, or shalwar kameez in
the school colours. From 1993, it also permitted girls to wear headscarves.
The uniform did not, however, extend to the jilbab, and when the girl
decided to adopt this, she was told to change back into school uniform or
transfer to another school that would permit this form of dress. In the
event, she lost nearly two years’ schooling before being accepted at
another school.
In the first of three judgments dealing with this, the judge decided there
was no case to answer.15 This was reversed by the Court of Appeal in 2005,
mainly on the procedural grounds that the school had not recognized the
right to manifest one’s religion, and not therefore offered any justification
for the restriction its uniform policy imposed. Confirming the importance
commonly attached to religious belief (but also required to be attached,
given the wording of Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights), the judges stressed that sincerely held religious
beliefs cannot be dismissed without consideration, even if they represent
the views of the small minority of what they described as ‘very strict’
Muslims. The final judgment from the House of Lords determined that
there had been no interference with the claimant’s rights to manifest her
beliefs (because there was nothing to stop her going to an alternative
school); and, in a minority judgment, that there had been interference, but
that this was objectively justified. The judgment seems to have reflected
the care the school had evidently taken in devising its uniform policy,
including extensive consultation with pupils, teachers, parents, and local
imams, and the reluctance of the court to override the decision of those
best informed about local circumstances. So far, at least, it could not be said
to signal any particular stance regarding the tension between Islam and
gender equality.
A few months later, however, the newspapers were full of the so-called
niqab controversy when then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote a news-
paper article saying he felt uncomfortable talking to female constituents
wearing a full veil and had a policy of asking them to remove it. This
sparked much debate, with proponents of religious freedom ranged against
others identifying an increasing accommodation of (minority) religious
practices as threatening women’s rights. In 2006, a teaching assistant who
insisted on wearing the niqab when working with male colleagues was
suspended from her post in a primary school; interestingly, although an
industrial tribunal dismissed her claims of discrimination and harassment
on religious grounds, it accepted a claim of victimization, and the
educational authority was ordered to pay a small sum in compensation. It
is difficult, at this stage, to predict the likely course of future legal
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judgments, particularly given what we have noted as the coexistence of a
militant secularism with increasing government consultation with religious
organizations, and the recognition of religion as an equality ‘strand’ along-
side race, gender, disability, age and sexual orientation. Muslim women’s
attire is commonly represented as symbolizing oppression, and to that
extent is viewed in parallel with issues such as forced marriage or ‘honour’
crime. Yet it has been hard to represent the individual women who have
pursued cases through the tribunals and courts as lacking in agency and, for
the moment, there is no groundswell of support for anything approaching
a headscarf ban.
CONCLUSION
As compared with an earlier position of laissez-faire tolerance or
indifference, when violence against women in minority communities often
went unacknowledged, there have been some significant achievements in
the last decade. This was substantially as a result of the ongoing work of
minority women’s NGOs, but other key factors were the increased number
of women MPs, a developing culture of consultation between government
departments and NGOs, and the role of the media in highlighting
individual cases, albeit in an often sensational way. The period 1997–2007
witnessed a host of measures aimed at reducing forms of violence specifi-
cally affecting minority women. However, new measures were less effective
than they might have been, partly because of a focus on punishment and
legal remedies rather than support and prevention. The issues discussed in
this article also lend themselves to cultural stereotyping, which can then
feed public perceptions of multiculturalism as a mistake. Forced marriage,
FGM and ‘honour’ killings are still routinely referred to in media reports
as ‘cultural practices’, as if these reflect normal and widely endorsed behav-
iour in minority communities. This sustains a picture of ethnocultural
minorities as peculiarly oppressive to women, requiring rapid assimilation
into the more civilized ‘British’ norms.
So far as the specifics of policy are concerned, we have criticized the
sometimes symbolic use of legislation as substituting for more costly
interventions in the form of either educational initiatives or support work.
We have also suggested that the use of culture-specific rather than generic
legislation both reflects and contributes to public representations of
minority groups as patriarchal, traditional and backward, and is better
avoided. Our more general suggestion relates to the process of policy
formation. There has been a modest but still encouraging trend towards
consultation and engagement with the voluntary sector, as with the Forced
Marriage (Civil Protection) Bill, which was introduced as a private
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members’ bill, supported by Southall Black Sisters who contributed to the
drafting, redrafted through consultation with relevant organizations and
individuals, and finally endorsed by government. Potentially, at least, the
greater involvement of women’s NGOs in formulating strategies and
initiatives helps secure better ways to tackle abuses of women without inad-
vertently promoting abuses of ‘culture’.
As argued throughout, a preoccupation with abuses of women can feed
a more xenophobic agenda, but the preoccupation also reflects urgent need.
Women’s NGOs were working to identify and address violence against
women long before it figured in media representations of minority groups
or entered into the policy domain; and treating the concern simply as a
covert form of racism does little to assist those still exposed to coercion and
violence. The task, in Britain as elsewhere, is to act effectively against abuses
of women without encouraging cultural stereotypes. The evidence, so far, is
that this balance is best achieved where there is substantial and sustained
engagement with those organizations, mostly in the voluntary sector, that
can most legitimately claim to represent the experiences of minority
women. These will and do differ among themselves, and the policy initia-
tives any one of them supports will be no more infallible than those
supported by mainstream organizations. There is no privileged position that
provides infallible results. A variety of perspectives among minority
women’s NGOs is, however, important in challenging presumptions of
cultural homogeneity, and the chances of tackling abuses of women without
simultaneously promoting abuses of ‘culture’ are much improved when
there is a wider representation of all relevant groups.
The story from Britain is in many ways typical of the trends identified in
this special issue of Ethnicities, with a retreat from multiculturalism partly
fuelled by depictions of patriarchal minority cultures, and government
initiatives on gender equality that were perceived in some quarters as
covert attacks on immigration. To this extent, multiculturalism was set up
in opposition to women’s rights, and people were called upon to choose one
side or the other. At its worst, this promoted a complacent view of ‘British’
values as securely committed to gender equality, and an arrogant percep-
tion of minority cultures as riven with patriarchal violence. That worst-case
scenario continues to threaten (there are plenty of individuals who voice
it). But there are also indications that policy is evolving in more successful
ways. It is our view that the more encouraging outcomes owe much to a
prior history of minority women’s activism on the issues of FGC/FGM,
forced marriage and ‘honour’ violence.
When public authorities turned their attention to these, there were
already identifiable individuals and organizations with relevant experience
and expertise; and where these were consulted, more chance of devising
effective initiatives. This is only a small window of opportunity, and could
well be closed down in the turn towards greater consultation with religious
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authorities, for women are notoriously under-represented in religious
organizations. But it does hold out some hope, at least, that the tension
between agendas can be resolved. The fact that women may be more vulner-
able to coercion or violence within particular cultural groups does not
mean that coercion and violence are ‘cultural practices’. Politicians now
commonly make the point that culture is no excuse. But culture is also no
explanation, at least not if taken in the deterministic sense that represents
all men in a particular group as violent, or all women as victims. It has to
be possible to address abuses of women without in the process promoting
stereotypes of culture. Experience in the UK suggests that is most likely to
happen when policies are devised through careful consultation with all
relevant groups.
Notes
1 In referring to Britain, we mean Great Britain – England, Scotland and Wales
– these being the main focus of the initiatives discussed in this article. However,
some legislation, policy and public debate has a wider application, and here we
refer to the UK as a whole.
2 Alhaji Mohamed v Knott [1969] 1 QB 1. Under-age spouses have not qualified
for entry clearance since the mid 1980s.
3 Social Security and Family Allowances (Polygamous Marriage) Regulations
1975, SI 1975/561.
4 It has been argued that ‘cutting’ is a less emotive and more respectful term than
‘mutilation’, and it is our own preferred term. However, ‘mutilation’ is more
commonly used in the UK, including in legislation. We move between the two
terms as appropriate.
5 Though a copious literature demonstrates wide variations in practice, suggest-
ing that this too has a largely cultural base. For example, Dwyer (1999); Hoodfar
(2001).
6 The Act covers all religious beliefs (including a lack of religious belief).
However, while the UK’s ancient common law offence of blasphemy is no
longer used, it protects only the Christian faith and there have been frequent
proposals for its repeal.
7 In 2000, Denmark introduced new regulations, raising the age requirement for
family reunification for spouses from 18 to 24. For fuller discussion, see Siim
and Skjeie, this issue.
8 Available from the FCO website.
9 Findings from the Multi-agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in
London, prepared for the ACPO Homicide Working Group (Racial and
Violence Crime Task Force, 2003).
10 R v Abdulla M Younes, Central Criminal Court, 27 September 2003. Other cases
include that of Anita Gindha, who was found strangled in 2003, and Sahda Bibi
who died of stab wounds on her wedding day in 2003.
11 The Women’s National Commission is the official, independent, advisory body
giving the views of women to the Government
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12 Women and children in areas of London and Sheffield are best served with
specialist NGOs (FORWARD, the Agency for Culture and Change Manage-
ment and Black Women’s Health and Family Support) providing information
and support and the possibility of referral to specialist Well Woman Clinics for
treatment (reversal or obstetric care).
13 Adwoa Kwateng-Kluvitse from FORWARD. Her conclusion is that ‘to do
nothing to protect the child would be racist indeed!’ (Kwateng-Kluvitse, 2004).
14 ‘It caused a furore. People were so angry and said we were attacking their
culture but the feedback was that people were afraid and some families
cancelled their trips’ (Sarah McCulloch, the Agency for Culture Change and
Management, quoted in Sleator, 2003).
15 On I June, 2004, Judge J. Bennet dismissed an application for judicial review of
the school’s decision [2004] All ER (D) 108 (Jun). In R (on the application of
B) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] 1 FCR 530, the Court of Appeal
reversed this judgment. In R (on the application of Begum) v Head Teacher and
Governors of Denbigh High School) [2006] UKHL 15, the House of Lords,
restored the first judgment.
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